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UNFAIR DISMISSAL: PROCEDURE, FAIRNESS AND COMPENSATION 
 
ALEXANDER and HATHERLEY v BRIDGEN ENTERPRISES LTD. [2006] 
IRLR 422 
 
 
This article addresses those provisions of Employment Act (EA) 2002 
(implemented on 1 October 2004) which introduce statutory disciplinary and 
grievance procedures. In particular, it will consider the impact of the new 
provisions on traditional approaches to procedural unfairness by employers, 
the doctrine established by the House of Lords in Polkey v A E Dayton 
Services1 and the calculation of compensation in these cases. 
 
A significant recent decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, handed 
down by Elias P.2 has answered a number of questions about the meaning of 
statutory language which is described as ‘elusively vague’ by the President of 
the EAT.3  Inevitably, further questions remain. 
 
Procedural Unfairness 
 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s there was a debate as to the consequences 
of procedural failings by an employer when dismissing an employee, 
particularly where it seemed probable that the employee would have been 
dismissed even if all procedures had been properly carried out. Earlier 
decisions4 suggesting that this would render a procedurally unfair dismissal 
fair were rejected in Polkey where the House of Lords established what has 
come to be known as the Polkey doctrine. The likelihood of dismissal anyway 
if procedures had been properly carried out is irrelevant to the test of 
reasonableness (Employment Rights Act (ERA) 1996 s. 98(4)) unless, in 
exceptional circumstances, the normal procedural steps would have been 
futile. Instead, the likelihood of the procedural failure making no difference 
should be assessed and the compensatory award reduced by the appropriate 
proportion. This was widely accepted as a more just approach to the problem, 
avoiding the ‘all or nothing’ effect of the earlier approach. Where the dismissal 
was certain to have taken place anyway, 100% reduction could be ordered. 
 
Employment Act 2002 has, in part, reversed this ruling. It seeks to achieve 
two policy objectives:  to improve the quality and use of disciplinary and grievance procedures 
in employment;  to reduce the number of cases coming before the employment tribunals 
by encouraging the parties to explore other avenues before turning to 
litigation. 
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To this end it introduces new statutory disciplinary procedures.5, 6 If an 
employer dismisses an employee without going through these required 
procedures the dismissal is automatically unfair.7  This is provided by ERA 
1996 s. 98A (1). 
 
(1)     An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes  
 of this Part as unfairly dismissed if—  
(a)     one of the procedures set out in Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the  
  Employment Act 2002 (dismissal and disciplinary procedures) 
  applies in relation to the dismissal, 
(b)     the procedure has not been completed, and 
(c)     the non-completion of the procedure is wholly or mainly attributable 
  to failure by the employer to comply with its requirements. 
 
The employer will have no defence based on the s. 98(4) reasonableness 
test. What is more, the compensation awarded in these cases will normally be 
increased by between 10 and 50%, at the discretion of the tribunal8 and a 
minimum basic award of four weeks’ pay will be awarded9. However, where 
the employer can show that the employee would have been dismissed 
anyway, the Polkey doctrine will apply, thus simplifying the task of the tribunal 
in establishing liability while mitigating the financial consequences for 
employers.10  
 
It is worth noting at this point that the statutory procedural requirements are 
not very demanding. They are to be found in Part 1, Chapter 1 of Schedule 2 
to EA 2002 and require three steps.  
Step 1 is a written statement of the grounds for deciding to dismiss, with 
an invitation to a meeting. 
Step 2 requires the employer, before the meeting, to inform the 
employee of the basis for those grounds, so that the employee may 
consider his response. This need not be in writing. 
Step 3, if the employee wishes to appeal, requires the employer to 
provide an appeal meeting. 
The dismissal must not be implemented until the first two stages have been 
completed. 
 
Where the employer meets the requirements of the statutory disciplinary 
procedures, but is responsible for some other procedural failing which 
arguably affects the fairness of the dismissal the reasonableness of that 
action or omission will be assessed in the conventional way under s. 98(4) 
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ERA 1996. However, s. 98A(2) reverses, in part, the Polkey doctrine. It 
provides: 
 
Subject to subsection (1), failure by an employer to follow a procedure in 
relation to the dismissal of an employer shall not be regarded for the 
purposes of s. 98(4)(a) as by itself making the employer’s action 
unreasonable if he shows that he would have decided to dismiss the 
employee if he had followed the procedure.  
 
It is important to note that ‘procedure’ here means any procedure the 
employer may have, not the procedure laid down in s. 98A (1) above.   
According to Elias P., this will not apply to all cases where the statutory 
disciplinary procedures have been complied with. 
 
…even where the statutory procedures are complied with but the 
dismissal is unfair under s. 98(4), Polkey will still apply where on the 
balance of probabilities the employee would not have been dismissed 
even had a fair procedure been complied with, but where there is a 
chance that he might have been.11 
 
Thus the Polkey doctrine will still apply where the statutory procedures have 
not been complied with and where, in spite of compliance, there remains 
unfairness combined with a possibility (but not a probability) that the 
employee would have been dismissed anyway. 
 
The facts of Alexander 
 
Alexander was a case, like Polkey itself, of redundancy dismissal. The 
business was in difficulties, a number of employees had to be laid off and the 
employer introduced a matrix of six criteria. Employees affected were warned 
at a meeting of the risk of redundancy, told of the criteria, but given no detail 
as to the guidelines being applied to each criterion. Nine days later, at a 
second meeting, those selected were told, without an opportunity to comment 
on the assessment of their own particular performance. At this time they were 
given their own, but not others’ scores. They appealed and, just before the 
appeal meeting, their union representative was given the selection criteria, the 
guidelines and the (anonymised) marks of all. 
 
What is required by the statutory disciplinary procedure? 
 
The EAT applied the policy of the legislation to provide guidance as to what is 
required by the steps of the statutory procedure. They recognised:  
  the need for employees to have sufficient information to be able to give 
a considered and informed response to the proposed decision to 
dismiss;  
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 that only minimal standards were intended by Parliament, as the 
consequences of failure are automatic unfair dismissal and enhanced 
compensation, but that;  the defence available to employers who complied with the statutory 
procedures, but who otherwise failed to follow fair procedures and 
could show that dismissal would have occurred anyway suggested that 
the minimum requirement should not be set too low.12   
 
On that basis they concluded the following:  at step 1 ‘the employee merely needs to be told that he is at risk of 
dismissal and why’;13   at step 2 ‘the employee must be given sufficient detail of the case 
against him to enable him properly to put his side of the story’.14 
 
This formulation works well for misconduct cases, but redundancy dismissals 
are more complex. The employer must not only establish the view that 
redundancies are required but also which employees are to be selected. 
Where, as in Alexander, a matrix of criteria is applied, each employee should 
be told the selection criteria and his or her own assessment.15 That, however, 
is as far as it goes. An employee may not also insist on knowing the ‘break 
point’ (the score below which employees are selected for redundancy). Note 
that failure to provide this information may well render the dismissal unfair 
under s. 98(4), but not automatically unfair under s. 98A.  
 
The extent of the defence in s. 98A(2) 
 
We have already seen that s. 98A(2) may provide a defence to employers 
complying with these minimum criteria but nevertheless failing to carry out a 
fair procedure. Conflicting EAT decisions over the scope of this defence have 
been handed down in recent months. In a misconduct case, Pudney v 
Network Rail16  HH Judge McMullen QC suggested, obiter, that this only 
applied to minor or technical procedural failings.17 Where the defect could be 
seen as ‘substantive’ (for example, a wholesale failure to consult), the s. 
98A(2) defence should not apply. This view is rejected (equally obiter) by the 
EAT in Alexander, preferring a wide view of ‘procedural’ defects. Although 
neither decision is binding, the relative authority of the decision of the 
President suggests that this view is likely to prevail.18 
 
The impact on compensation 
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An employer’s failure to comply with the statutory disciplinary and dismissal 
procedures has two consequences for assessing the compensation to be 
awarded to the automatically unfairly dismissed employee.   
 
Basic Award: S. 120(1A) ERA 1996 provides that the Basic Award will be no 
less than four weeks’ pay unless (s. 120(1B)) that would result in injustice to 
the employer. This is therefore only of significance to employees with very 
short periods of employment. Any earlier payment of redundancy pay would 
need to be set off against the four week minimum payment in the normal way. 
 
Compensatory Award: s. 31(3) EA 2002 provides that where the employer is 
at fault in not completing the statutory procedure before proceedings are 
begun the Tribunal should increase the Compensatory Award19 by between 
10 and 50%.  This should not be done where ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
make it inequitable so to do. 
 
This raises a complication in the assessment of the Compensatory Award in 
s. 98A cases. Once the actual loss caused to the unfairly dismissed employee 
has been calculated, the appropriate uplift should be made. If, however, a 
Polkey situation exists there should also be a reduction to reflect the likelihood 
of the employee having been dismissed anyway. Given that these are both 
percentage calculations they can be made in any order without affecting the 
outcome.  
 
An example: An employee is dismissed after a flawed statutory dismissal 
procedure, the tribunal decides to impose a 20% s. 31(3) uplift but also 
concludes that there is a 50% chance that the employee would have 
been dismissed anyway.  The calculation of actual loss amounts to 
£10,000. The tribunal will enhance that figure by 20% (producing a sub-
total of £12,000) then apply the 50% Polkey deduction, producing a final 
total of £6,000. 
 
It should be noted, however, that where the Tribunal finds that there was a 
certainty that the employee would have been dismissed anyway, the Polkey 
deduction would be 100%, producing a zero Compensatory Award whatever 
the s. 31(3) uplift. This is what in fact happened in Alexander.  
 
A final point is that there may be circumstances where it is clear that an 
employee would have been dismissed despite failures in the statutory 
dismissal procedures, but that pursuing those procedures would have delayed 
the date of dismissal. In such circumstances the compensatory award should 
be restricted to lost income during that period of delay.20  
 
What must the employer establish? 
 
The remaining issue concerns the interpretation of s. 98A(2). This is the 
provision which disapplies the Polkey principle if the employer ‘shows that he 
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would have decided to dismiss the employee if he had followed the procedure’ 
(emphasis added). Some matters are clear. The burden is on the employer to 
establish this and must do so on an evidential basis, not on mere assertion. 
As in civil matters generally, the standard of proof is a balance of probabilities. 
What, however, must the employer show? According to the EAT in Alexander 
it is that there is a 51% or better chance of the employee being dismissed 
anyway.21 I suggest, with respect, that this is not a necessary interpretation of 
s. 98A(2), conflating the standard of proof with the nature of what must be 
proven. Other dicta of Elias P in Alexander draw attention to another, arguably 
more appropriate interpretation. 
 
The italicised words above indicate the statutory requirement. Elias P explains 
the meaning of this as follows:  
So once the statutory requirements have been met, the failure to comply 
with additional procedural safeguards will not render the dismissal unfair 
if the employer shows that the employee has not in fact been prejudiced 
as a consequence.22 
 
This, surely is what the policy of the legislation requires. The application of the 
Polkey principle is to be limited, but there is no suggestion that a dismissal 
should become fair if there is no more than a better-than-average chance of 
dismissal anyway. S. 98A(2) does not require an employer to show that he 
would probably have dismissed the employee, or even that it is more likely 
than not that he would have done so (as the 51% formulation would suggest). 
It requires him to show that he would have decided to dismiss the employee. 
 
It is, of course, inherently difficult to show what might have happened. The 
court cannot establish certainties. Thus, to speak of distinguishing between 
50% and 51% probabilities is hard to justify. The nature of the task was 
expressed well by Lord Prosser: 
 
It seems to us the matter will be one of impression and judgment so that 
a Tribunal will have to decide whether the unfair departure from what 
should have happened was of a kind which makes it possible to say with 
more or les confidence that a failure made no difference or whether the 
failure was such that one cannot sensibly construct the world as it might 
have been.23 
 
In Alexander itself the Tribunal had sufficient evidence before it to conclude 
that they could construct the world as it might have been and accept that 
there was 100% likelihood that the employees would have been dismissed 
anyway. The EAT expressed the view that such a finding will be relatively 
rare.24 This is undoubtedly correct. One of the classic examples of a 
procedural failing which would not breach the statutory requirements but 
would generally lead to a dismissal being unfair under s. 98(4) is a lack of 
consultation in a redundancy situation. The problem for the Tribunal is that it 
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is impossible to know what effective consultation might have achieved. In 
some circumstances a workforce might propose alternative ways of reducing 
costs so as to avoid a redundancy situation. In others, proposals for selection 
criteria which had not occurred to management might arise. In either case the 
outcome could be changed. This is why procedural failings can be so 
significant in unfair dismissal cases. It also explains why it would be 
inappropriate for the employer merely to have to show (on a balance of 
probabilities) that he would have been more likely than not to dismiss the 
employee after going through the procedures properly.  
 
This begs the difficult question of what the employer must show. The test 
cannot be that the employer must establish that it is 100% certain that he 
would have dismissed anyway, as this would in effect perpetuate the Polkey 
doctrine which the legislation was designed to replace in these cases. 51% is 
equally unsatisfactory for the reasons presented above. This is an issue ripe 
for further guidance from the appellate courts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
